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THE CAPTIVE MIND: ANTIPSYCHOTICS AS
CHEMICAL RESTRAINT IN JUVENILE
DETENTION
Ashley A. Norton
It is June of 2008. A woman is found slumped in her car, passed out in a
sea of narcotics.I An investigation reveals that she is the mother of a six
year old, Gabriel Myers.2 Removed from his mother's care, Gabriel is
tossed from one relative's home to another before being thrown into the
Florida foster care system. Merely a month later, Gabriel is molested by a
fourteen-year old.4 Later, most likely as the result of the trauma he suffered,
Gabriel begins acting out sexually towards other children he comes into
contact with.5 Suffering from severe mood swings, Gabriel is moved to a
diferent foster home after he began making threats towards his then foster
father and his foster parents' baby.6 In his final foster home, less than one
year after the day his mother is discovered in the car, Gabriel doesn't feel
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well, and stays home from school.7 Gabriel becomes frustrated and angry
while in the care of his foster parent's teenage son, and in a tantrum so
illustrative of his young age, throws his soup in the garbage.8  As
punishment, his foster brother sends him to his room.9 But Gabriel disobeys
this directive, instead locking himself in the bathroom.10 There, Gabriel's
actions no longer mirror those of a normal and emotionally healthy child
and escalate to far more than a childlike tantrum. 11 Alone, standing on the
cold tile of the bathroom, Gabriel hangs himself with a detachable shower
hose. 12
This desperate act of an emotionally disturbed or mentally ill child
became a tragic call to action for policymakers and leaders. At only seven
years old, Gabriel Myers was on at least three different antipsychotic drugs
the day of his suicide. Gabriel had been prescribed a variety of drugs for his
violent mood swings, including psychotropic drugs that are known to have
an increased risk of suicide.' 3 Using this story as an illustration of the need
for change, Florida lawmakers and advocates launched investigations into
antipsychotic drugs. 14 At issue in Gabriel's story was both the efficacy and
appropriateness in light of his age and the pervasive existence of the use of
these drugs for those in state custody.
While Gabriel's story sheds light on the plight of foster children, the term
"state custody" also encompasses another set of children: juveniles in
detention. These juveniles are just as, if not more, susceptible to the
pervasive manipulation of being overmedicated with antipsychotic drugs.
While the use of these powerful drugs in children is questionable and many
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purpose of such usage. Gabriel's story is one example of what many
advocates fear has become commonplace treatment of children in state
custody: the use of antipsychotics as a means to restrain children and to
correct behavioral issues that are not linked to the mental illness for which
the drugs were originally created to address. Examining Gabriel's story and
looking to lawmakers' focus on helping those in foster care provides both
arguments and a path for advocates of children in juvenile detention.
This Note will examine the issue of chemical restraint of inmates in
juvenile detention, (hereinafter referred to as "juveniles"), specifically
focusing on their use in Florida. Much discussion and investigation has been
focused on this issue in Florida. The focus in Florida began because of the
death of Gabriel Myers and continued due to an expos6 from the Palm Beach
Post that revealed the prevalence of this practice of overusing antipsychotics
as a means of chemical restraint within juvenile detention centers in
Florida. 16 Juvenile rights advocates have voiced concerns about the
medical, ethical, and legal implications and questions raised by this
practice.' 7 The necessity and importance of this discussion is illustrated by
Gabriel Myers' story. The tragic end to his young life may serve as a
cautionary tale to those in positions of power who work with lost and
troubled children whose pleas for help are silenced by drugs that sedate
rather than improve mental health.
This Note will also focus on the efficacy and safety of antipsychotics and
psychotropic drugs in general as well as special concerns that arise when
these drugs are prescribed to children. Additionally, this Note will explore
15. See Michael Laforgia, Drugging Juveniles: Doctors Hired to Evaluate Kids in
State Custody Have Taken Payments from Drug Companies, PALM BEACH POST, May 24,
2011, http://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/news/dosed-in-juvie-jail-drug-firms-pay-
state-hired-doc/nLsb8/; see also Mai Szalavitz, Drugging the Vulnerable: Atypical
Antipsychotics in Children and the Elderly, TIME, May 26, 2011,
http://healthland.time.com/2011/05/26/why-children-and-the-elderly-are-so-drugged-up-
on-antipsychotics/ (discussing children who are prescribed these medications without the
underlying conditions that the medications were designed to treat).
16. Laforgia, supra note 15.
17. See, e.g., April Hunt, Concern Over High Medication Rate Among Foster Kids:
Review of Kids' Psych Drugs Urged, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Feb. 20, 2011,
http://gabrielmyers.wordpress.com; see also Bob Jacobs, Legal Strategies to Challenge
Chemical Restraint of Children in Foster Care, A Resource for Child Advocates in
Florida, ADVOC. CTR. FOR PERS. WITH DISABILITIES, http://www.guardianadlitem.org
(search "Resources" for "Legal Strategies to Challenge Chemical Restraint of Children in
Foster Care" then follow link to PDF file).
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the use of these drugs to restrain and sedate in order to avoid poor behavior.
This Note will examine these issues in light of medical research, potential
legal claims, and consistency with the underlying goals and objectives of the
juvenile justice system, in Florida and nationwide.
Since the entire purpose of the juvenile justice system is to rehabilitate
rather than simply punish and remove individuals from society, Section I of
this Note discusses the creation, history, and trends in the purposes behind
the juvenile justice system. As mentioned above, recent events have shed
light on this issue in Florida with both foster care and juvenile detention, and
thus a portion of Section I discusses the juvenile system of Florida
specifically. Section II discusses the evolution and danger of the use of
antipsychotics, noting specific concerns within the medical community with
regard to their use in children. Section II also discusses the prevalence of
the usage of such drugs in juvenile detention and the problems inherent in
this practice. Section III defines and discusses the idea of "chemical
restraint," followed by an examination of Florida's use and judicial
interpretation of the practice. Finally, Section IV discusses the arguments
that advocates can effectively use to discourage and eliminate this practice.
I. JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: A BRIEF HISTORY
To understand why the use of chemical restraints is counterproductive to
the objective of the juvenile justice system, it is crucial to examine the
juvenile justice system's establishment, subsequent development, and
current trends and focuses.
A. National Juvenile Justice System & Trends
The juvenile justice system has evolved in its objectives and justifications,
as evidenced in three distinct movements. Preceded by a growing public
consensus that the common law system failed to address the unique
characteristics of the juvenile offender, the first movement included the
creation of a juvenile system, separate from the adult system. Today, a
separate juvenile justice system exists in every state. 19 This first movement
drew distinctions between juvenile and adult offenders, endorsing the view
that juveniles have increased malleability and decreased culpability. 20it
centered on the belief that these qualities of juveniles increased the
18. Thomas L. Hafemeister, Parameters and Implementation of a Right to Mental
Health Treatment for Juvenile Offenders, 12 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 61, 72-82 (2009).
19. Id. at 80.
20. Id. at 74.
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likelihood for rehabilitation. 2 1 The national trend for the state separation of
juvenile offenders was codified in the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act of
1938, which created a procedural framework whereby juveniles are
22adjudicated separately from adults, except under certain circumstances.
This first movement evolved from the belief that the current system was
23not adequately equipped to provide the intended objective of rehabilitation.
The driving force of the second movement was the Supreme Court's
extension of many procedural protections and formalities to the juvenile
court system.24 Prior to the Supreme Court's extension of these protections,
the procedural safeguards within the juvenile system had been informal and
based upon the rehabilitative needs of a juvenile rather than on their actual
25guilt or innocence. Yet, even as confidence in the ability of the system to
rehabilitate waned slightly, juveniles were still viewed as less culpable and
therefore subject to a different level of punishment, with a focus on guiding
them to better behaviors and decision-making.26
The third and current movement of this system's evolution occurred when
the public perceived that juveniles were becoming more violent and assumed
that juveniles were responsible for increased crime rates.27 The increase in
violence and crime was attributed to the failure of the system to prevent,
deter, rehabilitate, or punish juveniles.28 Rather than focusing on
rehabilitation, the objectives shifted to the need to punish juvenile
21. Id. at 74.
22. Meghan Lewis, Lessening the Rehabilitative Focus of the Federal Juvenile
Delinquency At: A Trend towards Punitive Juvenile Dispositions?, 74 Mo. L. REV. 193,
195 (2009).
23. Hafemeister, supra note 18, at 73-74.
24. See generally In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); see generally Kent v. U.S., 383
U.S. 541 (1966) (giving juveniles the right to the advice of an attorney for the
determination to transfer juvenile to adult system occurs, the right to a hearing on such a
matter, and the right to the same information that the court uses to make its decision).
25. Hafemeister, supra note 18, at 73-74.
26. Id. at 76.
27. Id. at 76-77.
28. Id.
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wrongdoers and protect the community. 29  As a result, there was an
expansion of the categories of circumstances that allow for the transfer of
juveniles to the adult justice system.30
While the trend for rehabilitation of juveniles began declining in the
1970S,31 the growing interest of the courts and legislatures to focus on the
varying punishment needs for juvenile offenders demonstrates the
continuing perception that juvenile offenders fundamentally differ from
adult offenders.32 Since courts have considered information developed from
neuroscience and psychology to demonstrate the differences and
vulnerabilities inherent in juveniles as a result of brain chemistry and
development, juvenile advocates can also use this in arguing against the
constitutionality of certain punishments. 33  In deciding that life without
parole was an unconstitutional sentence for a juvenile convicted of a non-
homicide crime, 34 the Supreme Court examined national attitudes, case law,
and legislative history and objectives behind the view that juveniles and
adults do not warrant the same punishment. 35  The Supreme Court's
reasoning specifically pointed to the "lessened culpability" and susceptibility
29. Id.
30. Id. at 77.
31. Samantha Schad, Adolescent Decision Making: Reduced Culpability in the
Criminal Justice System and Recognition of Capability in Other Legal Contexts, Journal
ofHealth Care Law and Policy, 14 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 375, 384 (2011).
32. See generally Schad, supra note 31.
33. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 2020 (2010) (holding that a sentence of
life without parole for a juvenile convicted of a non-homicide crime was
unconstitutional); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568-69 (2005) (holding that the
death penalty for a juvenile was unconstitutional); Miller v. Alabama, No. 10-9646, slip
op. at 2 (U.S. June 25, 2012) (holding that a statute that provides for mandatory sentences
of life without parole for juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment); Schad, supra note 31 (discussing these decisions and the
impact that neuroscience and psychological studies have had on the court's consideration
of issues on juvenile offender's culpability).
34. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2020 (2010).
35. Id. at 2026.
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to pressures that underlie the conclusion that a juvenile's criminal conduct is
"not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult." 36
B. Florida's Juvenile Justice System
In Florida, juveniles who find themselves involved in criminal activity
interact with the Florida Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ)."37 The DJJ is
responsible for all aspects of monitoring youth crime; including prevention,
detention, treatment, and working with the legislature to adequately reflect
the objectives of the juvenile justice system.
A juvenile's involvement in the justice process begins with intake at the
DJJ, followed by formal adjudication in juvenile court.39 Initial intake
involves an assessment by the DJJ case management team of the risks and
needs of the individual juvenile offender, with a focus on determining the
"most ap ropriate dispositional services in the least restrictive available
setting. After the assessment, DJJ puts together a predisposition report
(PDR) that is given to the juvenile court as a recommended disposition.4'
The Florida Supreme Court, in identifying the standard that a juvenile court
42
must show in order to successfully depart from a decision of the DJJ, noted
that Florida's legislatively-created juvenile process has complementary goals
of protecting the public from delinquent acts and rehabilitating juveniles
through a consideration of "the child's individual rehabilitative needs.. .and
treatment plan."43 In 2009 the Florida Supreme Court held that in order for a
36. Id.
37. See Florida Department of Juvenile Justice Mission Statement, FLA. DEP'T OF
JUVENILE JUSTICE, http://www.djj.state.fl.us/AboutDJJ (last visited Oct. 18, 2012).
38. See generally Report of the Blueprint Commission, FLA. DEP'T OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE (2008), http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/documents/Reportof the-
Blueprint Commision.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2012); see also Florida Department of
Juvenile Justice: Juvenile Justice Process, FLA. DEP'T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE,
http://www.djj.state.fl.us/AboutDJJ (last visited Oct. 17, 2012).
39. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.03 (West 2011).
40. Id § 985.03(21).
41. Id. § 985.433(6).
42. E.A.R. v. State, 4 So. 3d 614, 637 (2009).
43. Id. at 618.
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juvenile court to depart from the DJJ's recommended disposition, it must
provide specific reasons that address and explain why such a departure is
necessary to provide the juvenile with the "most appropriate" services
conducted in the "least restrictive setting.""
Advocates for juveniles should use the distinct policy and societal goals of
the juvenile court system, as compared to the goals of the adult court system,
in making arguments regarding rights and quality of treatment in juvenile
detention centers. The objectives of a specific juvenile system have
significant impact on the rights of juvenile offenders given and the deference
afforded to focusing on rehabilitation as a goal of punishment.45
1I. ANTIPSYCHOTICS & JUVENILES
A. Antipsychotics in General
Antipsychotic drugs are within the larger classification of psychotropic
medications.46 For the purposes of this Note, they are defined as "any
chemical substance prescribed with the intent to treat psychiatric disorders
or other medical illness, with the effect of altering brain chemistry." 7 These
are powerful drugs for which prescription should not be taken lightly. Not
only is there a lack of data and information on how antipsychotics affect
brain development during teen years,48 but the drugs also have a number of
extreme side effectS49 that may not be outweighed by the questionable
44. Id. at 637.
45. See Hafemeister, supra note 18, at 83.
46. Kimber E. Strawbridge, The Children are Crying: The Need for Change in
Florida's Management of Psychotropic Medication to Foster Children, 15 U.C. DAVIS J.
Juv. L. & PoL'Y 247, 257 (2011).
47. Id. at 257.
48. Mai Szalavitz, Drugging the Vulnerable: Atypical Antipsychotics in Children and
the Elderly, TIME, May 26, 2011, http://healthland.time.com/2011/05/26/why-children-
and-the-elderly-are-so-drugged-up-on-antipsychotics/.
49. Szalavitz, supra note 48 (side effects include tics, increased heart rate and blood
pressure, vomiting, increased appetite and weight gain, sleepiness, an effect on the body's
regulation of temperature, and being linked to the presence of suicidal thoughts and
attempts. Other side effects include akathisia (motor restlessness, desire to remain in
constant motion), acute dystonia (spasms of upper body, face, tongue and eyes),
neuroleptic malignant syndrome (rare but potentially fatal, it is characterized by muscular
2012 159
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efficiency of the medication.so While these side effects occur with the
drug's use in general, some argue that children are especially vulnerable. 5
Because there has not been enough research conducted on the use in
children, it is impossible to know the full effects of such powerful drugs on
52
children. The medications are known to increase risks for diabetes, heart
defects, weight gain, and cause sedation.Y Dr. Richard A. Friedman
recently cautioned that even though these drugs can be safe and effective,
their use should be limited to a serious mental illness for which they were
created.54
Despite their powerful results and unknown effects in children, the use of
these drugs has increased significantly in the past decade.55  Due to the
characterization by some experts that these drugs "[bathe] the brains of
growing children . . . [and] threaten the normal development of the brain,"5 6
best practices dictate that psychotropic drugs should be used only as a "last
resort" and never as the sole approach to addressing a child's mental health
needs. 57  One mother whose eighteen-month old was placed on
rigidity and altered consciousness), and tardive dyskinesia (involuntary movements of
various body parts, which can be irreversible)).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Alina Selyukh, U.S. Advisors Urge FDA to Address Antipsychotics in Kids,
REUTERS, Sept. 22, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/23/us-usa-fda-
antipsychotic-idUSTRE78L77L20110923.
53. See Duff Wilson, Child's Ordeal Shows Risks of Psychosis Drugs for Young,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/02/business/
02kids.html?pagewanted=all.
54. Richard A. Friedman, M.D., A Call for Caution on Antipsychotic Drugs, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 24, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/25/health/a-call-for-caution-in-
the-use-of-antipsychotic-drugs.html? r-0.
55. Leigh Donaldson, Psychiatric Drugging of American Children is Cause for
Alarm, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, May 3, 2010, http://www.pressherald.com/
opinion/psychiatric-drugging-of-american-children-is-cause-for-alarm_2010-05-03.html.
56. Donaldson, supra note 55.
57. Id.
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antipsychotics described the experience: "I didn't have my son. It's like,
you'd look into his eyes and you would just see just blankness."
Yet, the use of these drugs continues to increase significantly. 59 The
initial increase, during a period sometimes coined the "Decade of the
Brain,"60 began in the 1990s and marked a shift in the classification of
mental illnesses as brain diseases treatable with pharmacological solutions.
This viewpoint, which was endorsed by the U.S. Government,62 contributed
to the shift in pharmacological treatment as related to pediatric mental illness
treatment.63 One study found that prescriptions for antipsychotics for
children between the ages of two and eighteen increased five-fold between
1995 and 2002.64 Of these prescriptions, over fifty percent were prescribed
for uses that the effectiveness of the drugs have not been completely
researched or tested, such as behavioral problems. 65
Pediatric psychiatrists and medical professionals caution the FDA from
approving antipsychotics for use in children and urge for more studies to
determine their long-term effects.66 A former president of the International
58. Wilson, supra note 53.
59. Olivia Burton, "They Use it Like Candy": How the Prescription of Psychotropic
Drugs to State-Involved Children Violates International Law, 35 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 453,
471-472 (2010).
60. Id. at 472.
61. Id.
62. See Burton, supra note 59, at 478 (discussing George W. Bush's official
statement that "millions of Americans are affected each year by disorders of the brain" as
an example of the U.S. Government's endorsement of the biological view of mental
illnesses as well as an increase in funding for drug research).
63. Id. at 480 (quoting sociologist Dr. Peter Conrad, "The 1990s may become known
as the decade of psychotropic medication use in children" and the significant increase in
prescription of psychotropic drugs to children).
64. W.O. Cooper et al., Trends in Prescribing of Antipsychotic Medication for U.S.
Children, 6 AMBULATORY PEDIATRICS 79, 82 (2006).
65. Id. at 82.
66. See Joseph Shapiro, FDA Debates Safety of Antipsychotic Drugs in Kids,
NPR.coM, June 9, 2009, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?
storyld=105133174 (discussing the pediatric health advisor's urging the FDA to
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Narcotics Control Board (INCB) holds the belief that such prescribing is an
example of "medicalising something that is often not a medical condition."67
The American Psychological Association noted that using these medications
68in children touched upon unique risks and concluded that there was a need
for more research on the efficacy and safety balance of these medications in
children. 6
9
B. Antipsychotics and Juvenile Detention
Juveniles in detention are especially vulnerable to overmedication in light
of their age, their decreased control over their surroundings, and their lack of
power to determine their own medical treatment. 70  The rate of these
prescription drugs is significantly higher for children who are involved with
the state, either in foster care or juvenile detention.n While, in general, only
8-10% of children under the age of eighteen are prescribed mental health
medications, this number is dramatically higher in the population of children
under eighteen and in state-custody: 72 an estimated 50% of children under
eighteen who are within state custody receive medication meant to address
adequately warn of the dangers of these drugs in children with labels and in continuing to
closely monitor the level of prescriptions and risks of these medications in children).
67. Burton, supra note 59, at 497-98.
68. Working Group on Psychoactive Medications for Children and Adolescents,
Report of the Working Group On Psychoactive Medications for Children and
Adolescents: Psychopharmalogical, Psychosocial, and Combined Interventions for
Childhood Disorders: Evidence Base, Contextual Factors, and Future Direction, AM.
PSYCHOLOGICAL Ass'N, 15 (Aug. 2006), http://www.apa.org/pi/families/resources/child-
medications.pdf (noting that absorption, metabolism, and distribution differ amongst
children and that the rates tend to evolve with the child's age and development as well as
the lessened ability of children to note changes and reactions to the medication differing
over time).
69. Id.
70. See Szalavitz, supra note 48 (discussing how many people shy away from taking
such medications, in contrast to the ability ofjuvenile offenders and their lessened ability
to refuse).
71. Burton, supra note 59, at 457.
72. See Burton, supra note 59, at 457. For the purposes of this Note, "state-custody"
includes both children in foster care and juvenile detention.
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mental health issues. Antipsychotics were among the top drugs purchased
and used to treat problems for which they were not approved.14 While it
varies by state, nation-wide studies of state facilities reveal stunningly high
numbers of psychotropic medication dispensed.
While the sheer number of prescriptions written is troubling, the
controversy centers on three issues: whether the amount of prescriptions
written accurately corresponds to the actual necessity of these drugs being
administered to juvenile offenders, the method under which the diagnoses
and prescriptions are made, and the safety of the use of these drugs on
76juveniles in general. Associate Professor Burton asserts that there is a
nationwide "practice of serious departures from sound medical practice in
the use of psychotropic drugs" among juveniles in state detention centers.n7
The use of a medication for a purpose other than that specified on the
label is known as "off label" use and is acceptable so long as there is
adequate consent of the patient involved.79 However, such drugs have not
necessarily been FDA approved for this "off label" use, as they have not
undergone the testing necessary to be approved for that particular use.80 The
increased danger of combining different types of these powerful
antipsychotic drugs enhances the likelihood of negative reactions when
drugs are used "off label."
73. Burton, supra note 59, at 457.
74. Szalavitz, supra note 48.
75. See Burton, supra note 59, at 475 (72% of the girls in Oregon's juvenile
correctional facilities are taking psychotropic medications, 40-50% of children in some of
Pennsylvania's juvenile prisons, and 10-50% of children in NJ correctional facilities).
76. See generally Burton, supra note 59.
77. Id. at 512.
78. Strawbridge, supra note 46, at 261 (citing Treatment of Children with Mental
Disorders, PSYCHCENTRAL (Sept. 2000), available at http://psychcentral.com/
disorders/childtreatment.htm).
79. Strawbridge, supra note 46, at 261; Burton, supra note 59, at 462.
80. Strawbridge, supra note 46, at 262-63.
81. Carol Hoy, Polypharmacy in Children on the Rise in the U.S., MED. NEWS
TODAY, Aug. 2, 2005, http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/medicalnews.php?
newsid=28500.
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It is often difficult to ascertain whether a sufficient amount of consent
exists to warrant such usage when prescribing to children. 82 This problem is
more complicated where the juvenile is in state custody, such as in juvenile
detention, rather than in the custody of a parent or guardian. 83 Some studies
suggest that the failure to gain informed consent for treatment with
psychotropic drugs is pervasive in juvenile detention.84  Though there is
some guidance from the Supreme Court on juveniles and consent,85 consent
parameters vary by state. 86
Florida statute allows consent to "medical treatment" for a juvenile in DJJ
to be obtained from the caseworker, probation officer, or administrator of a
detention facility in certain circumstances. This consent may be obtained
when the party that is otherwise authorized by law to give consent (i.e.,
parent or legal guardian) cannot be contacted88 (after reasonable attempts to
do so have been made) and where that party has not expressly objected to
consent.89
However, the prescription of psychotropic medication is specifically
excluded from the term "medical treatment" as used in the statute.90 Thus,
the DJJ is authorized to do a medical screening of the juvenile without
82. Strawbridge, supra note 46, at 261.
83. Id. at 267-68.
84. Burton, supra note 59, at 510 (citing letters from a DOJ investigation where
procedures and methods were not formal or consistent in obtaining consent for such
treatments).
85. See Hafemeister, supra note 18, at 129-30 (discussing the Supreme Court's
holding that a juvenile's constitutional right to make medical decisions is limited at best;
as well as the Court's general endorsement of the rule that to treat juveniles, parental or
legal guardian consent is required to be obtained).
86. Id. at 129-30.
87. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 743.0645(1)(b) (West 2011).
88. Id. § 743.0645(3) (requires that reasonable efforts to contact such person must be
made).
89. Id. § 743.0645(3).
90. Id. § 743.0645(1)(b).
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consent.91 If medical treatment is determined to be necessary, the physician
is required to either get consent from a parent or legal guardian or obtain a
court order authorizing the treatment.92 For psychotropic medication, the
physician must attempt to obtain express and informed consent from the
parent or legal guardian unless there is an emergency need for the
medication, parental rights have been terminated, the location of the parent
is unknown and cannot be reasonably ascertained, or the parent or legal
guardian declines to consent. 9 3  If the juvenile falls into one of the
exceptions from informed consent listed above, the physician and DJJ can
request a hearing to have a court order.94
Informed consent as defined by Florida law 95 requires certain information
be given to the guardian or parent of the minor.96 If DJJ is the legal
guardian, a court hearing shall be held to determine the medical necessity of
the treatment. 97 There is a preference for parents of minors in the system to
be involved in the decision for treatment if the parent is available.98
91. Id. (defining medical care and treatment as including ordinary and necessary
medical and dental examination and treatment, including blood testing, preventive care
including ordinary immunizations, tuberculin testing, and well-child care, but does not
include surgery, general anesthesia, provision of psychotropic medications, or other
extraordinary procedures for which a separate court order, power of attorney, or informed
consent as provided by law is required).
92. Id. § 39.407.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See id. § 394.455(9) ("Express and informed consent" means consent voluntarily
given in writing, by a competent person, after sufficient explanation and disclosure of the
subject matter involved to enable the person to make a knowing and willful decision
without any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, or other form of constraint or
coercion).
96. See id. § 39.407 (reason and purpose for the treatment, risks benefits and side
effects, specific dosages and length of treatment, alternatives, difficulties of stopping
treatment, and the fact that consent for the treatment can be withdrawn at any time).
97. See id.§ 39.407.
98. See id
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III. ANTIPSYCHOTICS & "CHEMICAL RESTRAINT": DEFINING AND
IDENTIFYING CRITICISM
According to the American Association of Child and Adolescent
Psychiatry (AACAP), "chemical restraint" of a child is the use of a drug
without a therapeutic purpose and with the sole purpose of sedating and
immobilizing the child. Other scholars refer to chemical restraint as
"forcible or indiscriminate use of powerful psychotropic drugs in the
absence of appropriate medical justification.' Studies suggest that
juveniles in detention are prescribed these drugs not for the purpose of
treating legitimate medical conditions or mental health problems, but rather
as a way to control "aggressive, unruly, or otherwise problematic"
children, or even to punish, restrain, or sedate children for merely
annoying behavior.102 Poor behavior and acting out by juveniles is often
caused by a variety of risk factors, including family background. Simply
medicating such behavior is not always likely to be helpful or efficient, and
can actually mask the real issues. 103
Use of chemical restraint is further criticized in light of safer alternatives.
Instead of using such powerful drugs, there are other methods available to
resolve the emotional and behavior problems of state-involved children. 104
Among the suggestions for safer treatment are psychosocial treatments
involving both the family and the juvenile, which may be more effective
with regard to addressing the problems that drive the behavior of many
juvenile offenders.105 In light of an expressed preference for the "safest
treatment with demonstrated efficacy,"' 06 the American Psychological
Association (APA) concluded in 2006 that psychosocial treatments are safer
99. Burton, supra note 59, at 492.
100. Kathleen Auerhahn & Elizabeth Dermody Leonard, Docile Bodies? Chemical
Restraint and the Female Inmate, 90 J. OF CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 599, 604 (2000).
101. Burton, supra note 59, at 493.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 495.
104. Id. at 493.
105. Id. at 506.
106. Working Group, supra note 68, at 15.
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than psychotropic drugs and recommended that, in most cases, psychosocial
treatment be used with children.1 07
Some critics argue that advertising by drug companies and gift-giving by
physicians creates a conflict of interest for the psychiatrists prescribing these
medications. 10 For example, in Florida, approximately one-third of the
psychiatrists hired by the state to work with incarcerated juveniles are
receiving pharmaceutical company incentives. 109 That same one-third of
state-employed Florida physicians is responsible for over half of the
antipsychotic prescriptions to juveniles in detention facilities. 1o This causes
serious doubt on whether the medications are being prescribed because they
are necessary or whether the writing of prescriptions is influenced by other
motivations."' Dr. Bruce Perry, a senior fellow at the Child Trauma
Academy in Houston, suggests that if doctors would begin prescribing
antipsychotics "reasonably and cautiously," the rate of prescriptions written
would drop by ninety percent.112
Furthermore, critics argue that not only is the safety of using these drugs
in children uncertain, but their efficiency and necessit' to solve the problems
for which they are being prescribed is also unclear." The argument is that
these drugs are being used not as medically necessary, but as a means to
control social or behavioral problems. In other words, these drugs are a
"chemical sledgehammer" to make state-involved children "easier to
manage." 1 4
An expert who investigated a juvenile detention facility in Puerto Rico
revealed information that shows that the administration and distribution of
psychotropic drugs was done in a manner inconsistent with standard and best
107. Id. at 16.






114. Burton, supra note 59, at 454.
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practices." 5 The expert concluded that the psychiatric care given through
those facilities was not adequate, noting that the prescribing of psychotropic
drugs seemed "behaviorally driven" rather than diagnosis-driven. This
means that specific doctors were more likely to prescribe certain types of
drugs based upon their preference rather than on the need of the individual
patient.116 Additionally, based upon the doses, the expert concluded that
these medications were likely used as sedatives. 7 The expert's
investigation also led her to conclude that given the history of trauma that
most of the minors experienced, weekly sessions of psychosocial treatment
would have been necessary but impossible given the number of
psychologists employed. "'
A. Specific examination ofFlorida & chemical restraint issues
While juvenile offenders are one part of the term "state-involved
children," it also includes another large and vulnerable population: foster
children.' 19 In order to examine the issue within the context of juvenile
detention centers, it is helpful to look at how experts and advocates in
Florida have reacted to this issue within the population of foster children.
Like children in juvenile detention, children in Florida's foster-care
system receive a higher number of prescriptions: such children are three
times as likely to be prescribed psychotropic drugs as the national
average.1 One expert examining this issue reviewed a number of reasons
that this population may be subject to overmedication, including a flawed
system of consent, administrative errors, poor oversight, and pharmaceutical
companies providing incentives which may be causing an increased number
of physicians writing prescriptions for these drugs.121
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. (finding doses of 50 mg nightly as being most likely used for sedatives).
118. Declaration of Expert Witness Laura Davies, M.D., U.S. v. Commonwealth of
P.R., No. 94-2080, 2007 WL 4221948 (P.R. 2007).
119. See generally Strawbridge, supra note 46.
120. Id. at 251-52.
121. See generally id. at 263-64.
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Since there is no clear and decisive test to determine whether mental
illness is at the heart of the problem, it is difficult to draw the distinction
between behavioral problems that often plague foster children and an actual
mental illness that requires the serious medication of antipsychotics.122
Aware of this reality, some critics of this system have recommended that
Florida have medical advocates involved to help ensure that the decision to
medicate is unbiased and based upon a true need for such medication, rather
than an effort by frustrated foster parents and schools to sedate or chemically
restrain children. 123
However, previous reform of Florida's system has recognized both the
seriousness of giving psychotropic drugs to children and the importance of a
child's right to consent to medication, or, in the alternative, to have a
responsible and cautious adult make that decision for them.124 Although the
system is flawed, overworked, and subject to human and administrative
error, Florida is one of only ten states that has such a rigorous consent
procedure to ensure that psychotropic drugs are administered with the
consent of responsible adults when biological parents are unavailable. 125
B. Courts on Chemical Restraint
Though the Supreme Court of the United States has not yet addressed the
issue of antipsychotic drugs used as chemical restraint, it has previously
addressed issues of psychotropic drugs. These decisions may shed light on
the attitude likely to be shared by courts facing this issue. For example, in
Washington v. Harper,126 the Supreme Court examined whether adult
inmates could refuse medication or treatment, and at what burden the state
could override that refusal.127  The Court upheld the right to refuse
medication, but held that the state must "reasonably relate"l28 the medication
122. Id. at 267-68.
123. See id. at 297.
124. Id. at 291.
125. Id.
126. See generally Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1989).
127. Auerhahn, supra note 100, at 603.
128. Id.
169
170 The Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy Vol. XXIX: 1
to "penological interests."' 29 The Court's dicta may suggest that it may be
interested in the purpose for which the medication is prescribed.
In Harper, the Court noted that because a psychiatrist had prescribed
medication to an inmate, the medication was in the inmates "medical
interest," thus lessening the state's burden.1 30 This suggests that the Court
upheld the medicating of an inmate because if a physician prescribes certain
medication, it is presumably based upon the medical interests of that inmate.
Therefore, the Court may find prescribed medication in a juvenile's medical
interest regardless if the medications are antipsychotics prescribed to sedate
rather than for a medically necessary purpose. However, this conclusion
rests solely on the fact that the medication was prescribed by a psychiatrist
and does not consider the best interest of the child, the reasons for
prescription, or the doctor's care in prescribing such medication.
IV. ARGUMENTS AGAINST CHEMICAL RESTRAINT
A. Inconsistency with Public Policy and the Purpose of the Juvenile Justice
System
As mentioned in Part I, examining a state's juvenile justice system
objectives is important for determining the scope of a juvenile's rights
within that state. The model to which a particular state adheres will have
an effect on the judge's or society's examination and interpretation of
juveniles' right to treatment.132 An examination of documents put forth by
the DJJ clearly suggests that Florida subscribes to a rehabilitative approach
to the juvenile system.1 3 3 At the 2007 announcement of a coalition to
reform Florida's juvenile justice system, Governor Christ reminded the
public and decision-makers to "...always remember that we can never give
up on our young people."' 34 In a released report on the DJJ's strategy to
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See Hafemeister, supra note 18, at 83.
132. See generally id. at 72-82.
133. See FLA. DEP'T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, A FOUR YEAR STRATEGIC PLAN 2008-09
THROUGH 2011-12 (2008), available at http://www.djj.state.fl.us/docs/about-us/2008-09-
strategic-plan.pdfsfvrsn=2.
134. Id. at 8.
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reform the juvenile system between 2008 and 2012, the committee noted its
objective to keep children from entering the DJJ system by acknowledging
that once a child enters the system, there is limited power to rehabilitate the
juvenile. 135
The focus on the limited success of rehabilitation indicates that
rehabilitation is an important goal of this system. Additionally, the DJJ
specifically noted the poor performance of mental health services in juvenile
detention, pointing to limited health service providers and the lack of an
organized holistic approach to the individual's needs as causes of such
failure.136 Furthermore, the DJJ's Strategic Plan suggests that its drafters
were unimpressed with a "correctional or retribution-based philosophy,"' 37
and desire to limit the situations in which a juvenile can be transferred to the
adult system.138 The Commission emphasized a core focus on preventing
juveniles from turning to crime and highlighted seven core values that
formed the bedrock of the reform, which included a recognition of the
distinctions between juvenile and adult offenders and community
responsibility to empower and support their youth. 139
As mentioned in the introduction, the story of Gabriel Myers illustrates
why this topic concerns advocates of juveniles and children.140 Florida is
experiencing controversy around the issues of overmedication and
prescribing of antipsychotics to children in foster homes, and also the use of
these medications in juvenile facilities as chemical restraint. The underlying
policy issues are similar: should prescribing children antipsychotic drugs be
a first and only solution, or should systems such as juvenile detention and
foster care systems take a holistic and individualized approach instead? To
answer that question, it is important to look at what goals and policies exist
in these systems, specifically the juvenile justice system in Florida. The
foster care system is relevant because it sheds light on how Florida has dealt
with this issue in that context.




139. Id. at 17.
140. Edecio Martinez, After 7 year old Gabriel Myers' Suicide, Fla. Bill Looks to
Tighten Access to Psychiatric Drug, CBS, Mar. 17, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/
8301-504083_162-20000546-504083.html?tag-mncol; I st;2.
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Florida's juvenile justice system, while still serving to punish juvenile
offenders, focuses on rehabilitation. Leaders have expressed frustration in
the past when the system has proven ineffective in working towards
rehabilitation rather than punishment. 141 The goal of an individualized
approach to treating mental health problems and rehabilitating individuals142
is not likely to be achieved if chemical restraint by antipsychotics is used,
because chemical restraint often masks the underlying problem and is only a
quick-fix solution. 143
Furthermore, since the poor behavior often associated with children
involved with the state (either as juvenile delinquents or foster children) is
usually caused by a variety of factors and often attributable to problems in
the child's past experiences, medication alone is usually not enough to fully
solve the issue. 144 Gabriel Myers' story provides an example of this
principle as well. While Gabriel eventually received therapy and mental
health assessments after a series of traumatic life events, his original
treatment was centered on a variety of psychotropic medications.145
Juvenile offenders and foster children are wards of the state, and Florida's
objective is to "never give up on our young people."1 4 6 However, a report
by the Gabriel Myers Work Group, which investigated the death of Gabriel
Myers, concluded that Gabriel was indeed "no one's child."l 47 Despite his
numerous interactions with members in the system in the ten months that he
was in the foster care system, it was apparent that he had no "champion" to
ensure his individual needs were met. The report examined antipsychotic
drug prescriptions in both the foster-care and juvenile detention systems and
issued a finding that the system failed Gabriel in that it was inconsistent,
141. FLA. DEP'T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 133.
142. Id.
143. Burton, supra note 59, at 494-95.
144. Id.
145. FLA. S. COMM. ON CHILD., FAMS., AND ELDER AFF., REPORT OF GABRIEL MYERS
WORK GROUP 3 (Oct. 18, 2011), http://flsenate.gov/PublishedContent/Committees/
2010-2012/CF/MeetingRecords/CF10182011 .pdf.
146. FLA. DEP'T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 133, at 8.
147. FLA. S. COMM. ON CHILD., FAMS., AND ELDER AFF., supra note 145.
148. FLA. DEP'T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 134, at 4.
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unorganized, and full of missed opportunities to correct problems. 149
Similar concerns have been voiced about the prescription of these powerful
drugs in a juvenile detention context, because records of amounts, patterns,
and reevaluation of the necessity of the drugs for particular individuals are
not being well-kept.
In short, the purpose of having a separate juvenile system is to focus on
rehabilitation and endorsement of the belief that juveniles, more than adults,
should be given a second-chance and a better opportunity to turn their lives
around. 1o The objectives of the juvenile system, especially in light of the
specific public statements and policy considerations in Florida, is to not
"give up"' 5' on youth and to "champion" 52 their needs. There is
recognition that more time and individualized approaches should be taken
with individuals because of the heightened belief in their ability to be
rehabilitated. In light of this objective, prescribing antipsychotic drugs to
juvenile offenders would only be consistent when there is a medical need,
when that necessity is outweighed by the risks, and where the individual
plan for that juvenile is complemented by the prescription of such powerful
drugs.
B. Other Potential Legal Implications
1. Criminal Prosecution
In response to the news stories revealing that Florida's Department of
Juvenile Justice was prescribing antipsychotics without medical necessity,
local juvenile Public Defender Howard Finkelstein commented: "If kids are
being given these drugs without proper diagnosis, and it is being used as a
'chemical restraint,' I would characterize it as a crime. A battery - a battery
of the brain each and every time it is given." 53 To establish a battery, one
must show that there is an actual or intentional touching of a person against
their will or intentionally causing bodily harm to another.154
149. Id. at 4-5.
150. See generally Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2020 (2010).
151. FLA. DEP'T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 133, at 6.
152. FLA. S. COMM. ON CHILD., FAMS., AND ELDER AFF., supra note 145, at 30.
153. Laforgia, supra note 15.
154. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.03 (West 2011).
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As the Public Defender's statement above may indicate, courts may be
receptive to an argument that prescribing antipsychotics to juveniles in
detention constitutes a battery if the purpose of prescription is chemical
restraint rather than medical need.' 55 That argument would posit that the
administration of psychotropic drugs to a juvenile in detention constitutes
intentional and actual touching of that juvenile. Of course, as a defense, the
physician or defendant would likely point to whatever form of consent was
obtained as required by statute.156 Thus, such an argument would need to
also address consent invalidly obtained or a complete lack of consent. Since
there is no current law or court decision in Florida that addresses pursuing
battery in this fact pattern, it is not clear whether the Florida courts would
find this argument persuasive, but it may be worth examination by state
juvenile advocates.
However, there is some case law in other jurisdictions that contain a
discussion of compulsory medical treatment and the tort of battery, which
may shed light on the way courts view medical treatment and battery.157 In
Davis v. Hubbard, the United States District Court discussed the history and
case law of the tort of battery in the context of compulsory medical
treatment. 158 In its opinion, the court emphasized that the purpose of the tort
of battery was to allow a person to "be free from unwarranted personal
contact." 59 The court explained that unwanted medical treatment could
constitute a violation of bodily integrity and personal dignity.160 A Colorado
Supreme Court decision discussing forcible administration of antipsychotics
noted that antipsychotics pose a "significant intrusion."' Using this case
law and the statutory language for battery, advocates for juveniles could
argue that the use of antipsychotics as chemical restraint is a criminal
battery.
155. Laforgia, supra note 15.
156. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 743.0645 (West 2011).
157. See Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 930-32 (N.D. Ohio 1980); see also
People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961, 968-69 (1985).
158. See generally Davis, 506 F. Supp. 915.
159. Id. at 930.
160. Id. at 930.
161. Medina, 705 P.2d at 969.
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2. Civil Litigation
Developing arguments for how juveniles in detention could litigate these
issues in civil court add an extra layer of deterrence for state juvenile justice
departments. These arguments also deter individual psychiatrists who are
prescribing these medications with possibly no medical need. In general, a
claim would arise when a medical professional subject to a medical
malpractice suit had deviated from the professional standard of care.162 The
test for medical malpractice brought under state law is established by
showing a failure to meet the professional standard of care. 163 In Florida,
the standard is whether the alleged actions of the psychiatrist prescribing the
antipsychotics represented a breach of prevailing professional standard of
care for psychiatrists.164 In this instance, it would likely be a claim of
affirmative action, arguing that prescribing antipsychotics was not
necessary. The claimant would need to show that the damages that occurred
were not "necessary and foreseeable results" of that medicinal procedure,
and that the procedure was not done within the professional standard of
165care.
Yet, Florida provisions dictating the standard of care against which
healthcare professionals are to be judged are applicable only when there has
been informed consent before the procedure was undertaken.166 Informed
consent is a doctrine that mandates a doctor to inform the patient of the
things a reasonably prudent medical specialist would disclose to a person of
ordinary understanding relating to the serious risks and possibility of serious
harm that may occur from a supposed course of treatment. 16 Informed
consent is meant to ensure the patient is able to make an informed and
intelligent decision on whether to proceed with the course of treatment
162. Hafemeister, supra note 18, at 104.
163. Id. (discussing how this is easier to meet than the constitutional standard as
defined by the Fourth Circuit of "substantial departure" from accepted professional
judgment).
164. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.102(1) (West 2011).
165. Id. § 766.102(2)(a).
166. Id § 766.102(2)(b).
167. Stephen Lease, Comparative Negligence; Informed Consent, 36 FLA. JUR. 2D
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 53 (Nov. 2011).
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recommended.168 As discussed previously, the presence or absence of
informed consent is an especially challenging issue in the context of juvenile
offenders and those within state custody.
One significant consideration is against whom the suit will be brought, as
judicial and sovereign immunity will likely play a role in the choice.169
Most judges will have judicial immunity, and the employees or staff of the
agency will most likely be immune from suit, although the agency itself,
depending on the law of the state, may be subject to suit.170 A tort claim
may be brought under two circumstances that would not necessarily be
covered by immunity. The plaintiff could allege more than simple
negligence, or, on the other hand, could allege simple negligence against a
healthcare worker who is considered to be an "independent contractor.", 71
Yet, even if the juvenile can show damages and defeat the defenses of
consent and immunity, the claim will be difficult to pursue if the physician
was acting pursuant to a court order.172
3. Detainees' Rights- Right to Treatment and Right to
Rehabilitation
Another way in which an advocate can assert juvenile ri hts is through
arguments involving prisoners' constitutional rights,' specifically
constitutional rights afforded to juveniles and viewed in light of the purposes
of a juvenile justice system. Courts have recognized but have not
thoroughly addressed juveniles' rights to treatment when in state
detention.174 While there are arguments that this right exists, commentators
168. See id. (stating that patient's decision should be based upon sufficient knowledge
to enable the patient to balance possible risks against possible benefits).
169. Hafemeister, supra note 18, at 104 (identifying several parties as potential
subjects for a suit: judge who ordered placement, agency with custody, and staff at the
facility).
170. Id. at 105.
171. Id. at 107.
172. Id. at 104.
173. See generally id. at 72-82.
174. See id. at 94; see generally Andrew D. Roth, An Examination of Whether
Incarcerated Juveniles are Entitled by the Constitution to Rehabilitative Treatment, 84
MICH. L. REV. 286 (1985).
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assert that such a right is broad.175 The purpose of the right is to ensure that
those the state takes into custody are being given proper mental health and
medical treatment. 176 The constitutional basis for asserting a right to
treatment comes from two possible places: the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause or the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment. 77
A key issue for defining the "right to treatment" of juvenile detainees is
determining the scope of the word "treatment." Thomas Hafemeister notes
that a narrow definition would include only medical treatment for diagnosed
diseases and medical illnesses, whereas a more broadly defined "treatment"
would include treatment for those juveniles with behavior problems that
indicate dysfunctional psychological response to underlying issues.7
Challenges to inadequate mental health services and treatment have been
examined under a "broad scope" of the definition of treatment.179
Hafemeister describes it as so broad that it may be more properly labeled as
a "right to rehabilitation."' 80 This expert also suggests that this "right to
treatment" appears to be gaining some momentum, most likely in response
to an increased awareness of the dangers and seriousness of mental
illness. 181 Although courts have asserted the existence of this right, they
have been reluctant to define it and certainly to second-guess the decisions
of the health care providers in juvenile detentions in administering
treatment. 182
Courts have given the administration of antipsychotics special attention
because antipsychotics are a pervasive method of mental health treatment
within juvenile detention. 183 The requirements focus on mandating the
175. See Hafemeister, supra note 18, at 110-16.
176. See generally id.
177. See generally Roth, supra note 174.
178. Hafemeister, supra note 18, at 64.
179. Id. at 83.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 84.
182. Id. at I 10.
183. Id. at 114.
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administration of antipsychotics when medically necessary, making sure
juveniles who need those drugs receive them. 184 While that is an important
focus, there should also be a limitation to that statement: that the
administration of such drugs should occur only when medically necessary,
and certainly not to control unruly or annoying behavior that could be better
solved by other means. Additionally, due to this right, requirements
emphasize the importance of trained personnel monitoring and assessing the
effects of those drugs on juveniles for whom they are prescribed, and ensure
that there is an ongoing review of the efficacy of the drugs in treating a
particular individual, and the revision of prescriptions and doses when
warranted.185
There is also discussion of other treatment options, including
psychotherapeutic services, and an assertion that the lack of availability of
these services could constitute a violation of the right to treatment owed to
juveniles. 186 This suggests that if a juvenile's behavior or illness would be
better served by therapeutic services but the juvenile is given drug therapy
instead, it could constitute a violation of adequate medical treatment.
a. The Fourteenth Amendment: Due Process Clause & the Right
to Treatment
The Fourteenth Amendment dictates protection for juveniles in a variety
of ways. The first protection guarantees that when juveniles are confined in
part for rehabilitative purposes, medical and mental health treatment will be
provided. 87 The opposition's argument to this is that while a state may
issue statements of interest in rehabilitating juveniles (as Florida has
certainly done), those statements do not create constitutional safeguards for
juveniles.8  Such opposition may argue that due process creates a right to





187. Roth, supra note 174, at 294.
188. Id. at 296.
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The second due process argument is a quid pro quo argument that in
lessening the procedural protections for juveniles, the Supreme Court
envisioned a system that includes rehabilitative rights for juveniles.1 9 0
Some, including the First Circuit,191 have argued that the Supreme Court
balanced the needs of juveniles and the juvenile justice system when they
held that lesser procedural protections were necessary for juveniles, thus
absolving the states of any additional affirmative duties to juveniles.19 2
Proponents of the quid pro quo argument respond that the Supreme Court
allowed lessened procedural rights because they expected the states to
pursue the rehabilitative aims of the juvenile justice system. 193 It would
follow that adequately treating a juvenile inmate's mental health problems
and behavioral issues is within that system and right, and a failure to do so
safely and fairly would prohibit a juvenile from being rehabilitated.
While these arguments have merit, some have concluded that if the state
has deprived a juvenile of his or her rights under the state police power
(protecting society from a juvenile who has engaged in criminal behavior),
and the juvenile has been given the procedural safeguards that are granted to
juveniles, the Constitution is silent as to whether the right to treatment
exists.194 Courts, although they have asserted such rights, have
insufficiently addressed the definition or depth of such rights and have been
very reluctant to second-guess the decisions of those who make treatment
decisions in juvenile detention.195 Others have suggested that these rights
have grown in importance along with an increased interest in juvenile mental
health needs being met in detention.196 Thus, courts may be more willing to
consider' 97 the plight of children in state custody, like Gabriel Myers. If
courts are receptive to a right to treatment, then the issue this Note addresses
should also be covered within that argument - that medical treatments
should be effective and actually be medically necessary in order to treat
190. Id.
191. Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172, 1177 (1st Cir. 1983).
192. Id.
193. Roth, supra note 174, at 291.
194. Id. at 307.
195. Hafemeister, supra note 18, at 86.
196. Id at 139.
197. Id.
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whatever needs the juvenile has. If drugs are not adequately achieving that
aim, other methods should be administered.
b. The Eighth Amendment's Prohibition on Cruel and Unusual
Punishment
In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, the
Supreme Court held that once "a State takes a person into its custody and
holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a
corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and general
well-being." In Estelle v. Gamble, the Court held that adults must
receive adequate care for "serious" medical needs and that juveniles are
afforded at least the same protections as adults. 199 Serious medical needs
have been defined to be either that which a layperson would know was
necessary or that which, in the absence of treatment, would cause a life-long
handicap. 200 The Supreme Court has not recognized rehabilitation as a
serious medical need for adults, 20 1 but courts have recognized psychological
and psychiatric care as "serious." 202
A violation of the Eighth Amendment exists if there has been deliberate
203indifference to a prisoner's serious illness or injury. The Supreme Court
has defined deliberate indifference as requiring more than a lack of ordinary
care for a prisoner's interests and safety, but less than acts or omissions for
the puTpose of causing harm or done with the knowledge that harm will
result. Though the Supreme Court has not spoken to the specific question
of chemical restraint being cruel and unusual punishment, lower courts have
issued opinions on this issue. In 1974, the Seventh Circuit held that the use
of tranquilizing drugs to control "excited behavior" of juveniles rather than
as part of a psychotherapeutic program and without medical direction or
198. Id. at 88 (quoting DeShaney v.Winnebago Cty. Dep't. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S.
189, 199 (1989)).
199. Id. at 94 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)).
200. Id. at 90.
201. Id.
202. Id. (citing Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44 (1977)).
203. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
204. See Hafemeister, supra note 18, at 90; see also Roth, supra note 174, at 307.
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endorsement constituted cruel and unusual punishment.205 When reaching
their decision, the court considered the interests of the state in controlling
and maintaining order while reforming juveniles, but ultimately concluded
that these interests were not so compelling that they overrode the interests of
206the juveniles in light of the potential danger of these substances.
Likewise, the Southern District of New York also concluded that the use of
tranquilizers as "medical restraint"207 and not therapeutic purposes
constituted a violation of the Eighth Amendment. 208
c. Additional Fourteenth Amendment Arguments
Another argument for advocates is to attack the violation of an
individual's liberty interest in being free from bodily restraint that is
209guaranteed under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
held that this liberty interest included the right to be free from chemical
restraints and that the use of antipsychotic drugs as a chemical restraint
violates that liberty interest.210 The court's decision classified these drugs as
having an even more "pernicious effect" 211 than physical restraints and held
that this interest was so fundamental that officials could not use qualified
212immunity as a defense.
V. CONCLUSION
This Note examined a current controversial issue. But an examination of
the history and prevalence of this issue reveals that the overmedication of
205. Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 356 (7th Cir. 1974).
206. Id.
207. Pena v. N.Y. Div. of Youth, 419 F. Supp. 203, 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (discussing
medical restraint as the use of tranquilizing drugs to control excited behavior of the
juveniles rather than for a therapeutic purpose).
208. Id.
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the vulnerable members of society is not a current development. For the
past few decades, there have been articles discussing the prevalence and
dangers of this practice with adults, women, foster children, and juvenile
offenders.213 In 2010, an article by Associate Professor Angela Burton
concluded that these practices with the United States violated provisions of
international law. Yet, not until May 2011 did this issue receive large media
attention. This issue still has yet to be significantly addressed by the courts.
The unfortunate plights of the overwhelming amount of children in state
custody, who are made vulnerable by their tragic circumstances, like Gabriel
Myers, demand the attention of courts and legislatures to correct this
problem. Advocates, courts, and legislatures must recognize the gap that
exists between the objective and the reality of the juvenile justice system.
As shown by judicial opinions and legislative and local government
statements, the goal of the juvenile justice system is rehabilitation. Thus, we
must rehabilitate our youth.
Merriam-Webster's dictionary defines "rehabilitate" as "to restore or
bring to a condition of health or useful and constructive activity."214 Using
medication to subdue and control vulnerable youth does not solve the myriad
of issues they face. Not only is it the wrong solution simply in light of the
dangers that those powerful drugs could pose to developing brains, but it
also in no way helps to right the wrongs in the lives of these young
individuals, nor does it provide a way for them to constructively solve their
issues in order to allow them to re-enter society.
213. See generally John D. Burrow & Rhys Hester, Dazed and Confused: Judiciary's
Role in Sell-ing Psychotropic Drugs to Inmates and Detainees, 36 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM.
& Civ. CONFINEMENT 3 (2010); Stacey A. Tovino, Psychiatric Restraint and Seclusion:
Resisting Legislative Solution, 47 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 511 (2007); Auerhahn, supra
note 100.
214. Rehabilitate Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/rehabilitate (last visited Dec. 16, 2012).
